To determine the outcome of anthrax immunisation.
Introduction

Voluntary Immunisation
In March 1998, a military field hospital was alerted for possible deployment and 129 members were listed to receive intramuscular immunisations with anthrax vaccine at 0, 3, 6 and 24 weeks. This was voluntary in response to concerns of Gulf War 1990/1991 veterans that, amongst others, anthrax immunisation could cause "Gulf War Syndrome".
Anticipated prevalence of side effects
Between 1976 and 1998, the Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM) received 19 reports of adverse reactions at a time when about 2200 doses of anthrax vaccine were issued annually. Only 10-15% of serious reactions may be reported to the CSM. Hence, with a possible total of 516 doses being administered, only one or two adverse reactions were expected and sick parade was considered satisfactory surveillance. However, when several personnel who had not attended sick parade mentioned having had significant adverse reactions following the first immunisation, a study was rapidly devised to elicit reports and to assess the relation to the immune response following each immunisation.
Methods
Data acquisition
Personal information and any previous immunisation were recorded. After each immunisation, a questionnaire (copies available from MJW) about any adverse reaction (nature, severity and associated incapacity) was provided. A copy was sent to absentees. Subject to written informed consent, a 5ml blood sample was taken and serum was stored at -80 o Celsius for enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for IgG to recombinant protective antigen.
Statistical Analysis
When sample variances were homoscedastic by F-test, the significance of differences between two mean values was assessed using Student's t-test and otherwise of medians by Mann-Whitney U-test.
Differences between three or more mean values were assessed by one-way ANOVA. 
Results
Completeness of response
Prevalence of adverse reaction
This dwindled with time and is shown in Table 3 . 
Date of anthrax No (%) who did No (%) who did
Discussion
Protection against anthrax Anthrax spores are a potent biological weapon (1). Fatal pulmonary anthrax results when sufficient spores are inhaled unless some effective preventive measure is taken (2) . Immunisation is one method (3). Pure recombinant protective antigen administered with Ribi adjuvant to experimental animals is encouraging (4) but has yet to be assessed in man. Although the old vaccine is considered safe, the number of adverse reactions and incapacity reported by a military medical unit was unexpected.
Completion of immunisation schedule
Initial acceptance of immunisation (76%) was comparable to that (78%) reported in American mill workers not withdrawn from a clinical trial (5) . In the present study, only 27 (21% of those initially listed) completed the immunisation schedule. A lower fall in uptake was found when civilian volunteers were immunised (6) . Continuing exposure to anthrax spores and a differing immunisation schedule might explain this difference. Decreased motivation could result when the threat of anthrax subsided. Non-availability of vaccine when reinforcement personnel returned to parent units was unlikely as reinforcements constituted an increasing proportion of those receiving subsequent immunisations. Adverse reactions were not the cause of this. Others (5, 6) found an increasing proportion had adverse reactions as time passed. However, adverse reactions decreased in the present study with those affected being undeterred from accepting subsequent immunisation.
Previous immunisation
Those immunised against anthrax 7 years previously were more willing to undergo immunisation than naive subjects and were more likely to report adverse reactions after the first immunisation of a new series. Recent evidence (7) suggested recipients of biological or multiple immunisations were more likely to satisfy the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention definition of "Gulf War syndrome" (8) . Nevertheless, the small group of British Gulf War veterans in the present study were not deterred from accepting anthrax re-immunisation and, presumably, had not associated previous immunisation with unduly adverse reactions or persisting symtoms. A previous report (5) mentioned two mill workers processing imported goat hair who were inadvertently immunised against anthrax when they had had clinical cutaneous anthrax 7 and 14 years previously. Both experienced severe local reactions at 24 and 48 hours after immunisation indicating that adverse reactions can occur in those reexposed to anthrax antigens many years later.
Prevalence of adverse reactions
The overall prevalence of adverse reactions (40%) was similar to that (35%) reported previously (5) but then the great majority of reactions were local with just 2 subjects (a prevalence of 0.2%) experiencing systemic reactions (see below).
Nature and severity of adverse reactions and associated incapacity
The distribution of adverse reactions (local, systemic and local with systemic) remained constant.
Previously a decreasing prevalence of local reaction and an increasing prevalence of local with systemic reaction were reported (6) . Distribution of severity between categories (mild, moderate and severe) remained constant with only a minority (21%) reporting severe symptoms. Of the 95 experiencing any type of adverse reaction at any time (the prevalence of adverse reaction decreased with time), 43 (45%) reported associated incapacity and of these, 27 gave the duration of incapacity. This lasted not more than 48 hours in the majority (17=63%). Thus, 18% of those receiving the initial immunisation were incapacitated for 48 hours but only 7% of those receiving the final immunisation. In most (74%), pain at the site of injection prevented lifting or driving for 48 hours. Previously, it was claimed that no incapacity occurred after anthrax immunisation (6) .
Relationship between adverse reaction and immune reponse
Darlow, Belton and Henderson (6) found no consistent relationship between the severity of reaction and the toxinneutralising antibody titre assessed by bioassay. The present study using a more sophisticated method to estimate antibody concentration supports this.
What prevented acceptance of immunisation?
No positive evidence has emerged to account for the failure to accept immunisation. Partly this was due to the omission of systematic enquiry whether members of the field hospital staff feared the risk of "Gulf War Syndrome" arising following anthrax immunisation and of why those failing to complete the immunisation schedule did so. However, the proportion of officers (38/47 = 81%) accepting initial immunisation was not significantly different from that of other ranks (60/82 = 73%) suggesting that seniority did not affect acceptance. It was mentioned above that reinforcements were more likely to complete the immunisation schedule but the proportion of these accepting initial immunisation (55/73 = 75%) was not significantly different from that of the permanent staff of the field hospital (43/56 = 77%). This suggests that whilst higher qualification may result in more likely completion of the immunisation schedule, it has no affect on initial acceptance. The facts that previous anthrax immunisation did not deter re-immunisation and that antecedent adverse reactions during the present schedule of immunisation did not prevent subsequent immunisation have been discussed already. Diminishing likelihood of deployment with the passage of time cannot be discounted as a cause of failure to complete the immunisation schedule.
Measures to improve the completion of the immunisation schedule
Anthrax immunisation is essential for protection. If compulsory immunisation for military personnel is unacceptable, a superior antigen inducing long lasting immunity following a single immunisation is required. Improvement in voluntary acceptance of this could result if potential recipients are shown the results of animal experiments which demonstrate dramatically the benefit of immunisation (3) . Side effects are unlikely to deter subjects from receiving immunisation provided these do not exceed the magnitude of those reported here.
